Nation building involved transforming South Vietnam into a "strong, stable, and prosperous society" (12). American and Vietnamese "ideas about nation building crucially affected the dayto-day functioning of the alliance" (12-13). But that alliance was never easy. The "Americans who went to South Vietnam after 1954 all too frequently found themselves adjusting, adapting, or discarding the nation-building plans and theories they had brought with them" (13). Such changes had to be made because Vietnamese social and political realities failed to conform to American plans and expectations. But very often, America's South Vietnamese allies confounded such plans themselves. They "had their own ideas about how nation building should proceed" (13). Nation building in South Vietnam, Miller argues, was "a field of contest involving multiple American and Vietnamese agendas" (13). Modernization theory and positivist social science guided American nation-building agendas, while personalism, an opaque doctrine both antiliberal and anticommunist, guided Diệm.
Diệm and his American advisers diverged on many issues. They disagreed particularly sharply about how best to pursue development in the countryside. At the beginning of Diệm's throughout the book, the people Diệm governed are left in the background, gray and undifferentiated. They are referred to as "the masses," "crowds," "mobs," "rural dwellers," "farmers," "highlanders," and "Buddhists," among other bland social aggregates. For Diệm and his American advisers, the people of South Vietnam were objects to be acted upon-resettled, indoctrinated, coerced, controlled, and made into productive citizens. They were treated as though they had no agency. They receive the same treatment in Misalliance. But the peoples of South Vietnam had projects and goals of their own. They pursued those goals in the context of overlapping social networks of mutuality and obligation. Notions of mutuality and obligation structured the relationships between landlords and tenants, employers and employees, clergy and laypeople, creditors and debtors, those who governed and those who were governed in South Vietnam. Such relationships defined people's identities and loyalties. But rapid economic change fueled by American aid, forced relocation, seemingly arbitrary violence or its threat, and official corruption eroded or destroyed many of these relationships in the countryside during Diệm's presidency. As a result, many people's loyalty to the government was eroded or destroyed. Large numbers of rural Vietnamese were increasingly unable to ensure the physical and economic security of their families or even to worship as they pleased under Diệm's rule. So they forged new relationships that allowed them to better pursue their goals and that engendered new loyalties. In many parts of South Vietnam, those relationships were with members of the NLF. Vietnam, Jessica Chapman seeks to understand just that misalliance. She argues that it began during Diệm's first two years of office. In opposition to Diệm and his government, the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài religious organizations and the Bình Xuyên criminal syndicate "had national political ambitions and substantial power and influence" (5). As a consequence, Diệm "constructed his government and developed its most unpopular institutions and practices largely in an effort to neutralize" them (6). The United States too readily accepted that "authoritarian rule was necessary to quell chaos in Vietnam, and that such a government would be capable of generating popular legitimacy" (7). The "authoritarian state system and indiscriminate terror tactics" that Diệm established between 1954 and 1956 "generated the widespread opposition to his government that encouraged Hanoi to form the National Liberation Front" (8). Vietnamese in the south. Similarly, the experience of repression cannot alone explain why many South Vietnamese joined the NLF. They had any number of motives. Some were coerced into joining. Others sought physical and economic security in the front. Still others joined because family, friends, neighbors, bosses, or fellow employees had joined the movement.
Understanding the conflict between Diệm and his rivals requires a more sophisticated picture of South Vietnamese society than Cauldron of Resistance portrays. Such a picture would depict the leaders and membership of the Hòa Hảo, Cao Đài, Bình Xuyên, and perhaps even the NLF in as much color as it does Diệm. This picture might be painted using captured documents in French and Vietnamese archives, as well as Vietnamese-language memoirs, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers, and monographs. Such documents might make it possible to understand the motives of Diệm's opponents as they understood themselves instead of the ways Diệm and his allies understood them. A more sophisticated picture might reveal South Vietnamese society as more than "wild" (13, 14, 15, 32, 38) , "almost anarchic" (70), or a "site of near anarchy" (74).
Cauldron of Resistance is wild in its own ways. In addition to persistent infelicities (such as referring to the Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, and Bình Xuyên collectively as "politico-religious organizations"), there are a number of careless mistakes in the body text (such as "enslaving in them in a manner" (140)) and some phrases and formulations are repeated ("controlled one third of the territory and population below the seventeenth parallel," on pages 4 and 74, for example).
Some items in the bibliography are incorrectly attributed (an article by Pascal Bourdeaux is said to have been written by Jérémy Jammes, for example, and the reference is garbled), while others are misspelled (the complete works of Pierre Mendès-France are cited as Ouvres Completes, rather than OEuvres complètes). But perhaps the most troubling errors are in the appendix of "Select Vietnamese Names with Diacritics." The preface states that "readers familiar with the Vietnamese language will notice the absence of diacritics and tone markers on Vietnamese words in the pages of this book." They have been excluded from the text "to render it more accessible to a wider range of readers. However, several important proper names, place names, and names of organizations appear with diacritics in an appendix" (ix). Unfortunately, the appendix is full of mistakes. The first appears on the second line: "Bảo Đại" is written as "Bảo Đạ." Three lines below, his cousin and prime minister, Prince Bửu Lộc, is entered in the
